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Abstract 
The present paper explores the different options for delivering public services by Portuguese and 
Brazilian municipalities. With reduction of human and financial resources and increase in demand, 
large municipalities need efficient arrangements to deliver public services. In fact, the conditions 
for providing these services influence the quality of life, the economic development and are 
directly related to the capacity of institutions to find the most appropriate governance 
mechanisms. In this context, the use of Transaction Costs Theory (TCT), specifically economic 
and political costs, reveals an appropriated tool to understand the ways how public services can 
be delivered. Existing research and theory point out several studies around the world that analyze 
how different governance mechanism’s choice (hierarchy, market and network) can be explained 
based on TCT. This paper contributes to expand this topic to Brazilian’s municipalities context, 
due to the lack of studies in this country. Contrariwise, there are more studies about Portuguese’s 
municipalities, but as a dynamic process, it’s becomes interesting update such studies in order to 
expand the existing database. In this sense we addressed a preliminary step whose objective is 
to identify the different options for public service delivery, finding similarities and differences in 
these two countries, following a qualitative approach. As results, we find that governance 
mechanisms adopted by two countries are very similar. The differences result from regional level 
in Brazil that allows recourse to state's business sector, as opposed to Portugal. In turn, 
Portuguese municipalities have several options that result from municipal associations, options 
that are more limited in Brazilian case. 
Keywords: Transaction costs theory; governance mechanisms; municipal service delivery.  
Introduction 
Ways of providing different types of public services have been studied by different authors in 
different countries, including Italy (Casula, 2019; Giacomini; Sancino; Simonetto, 2018), Spain 
(Campos-Alba, Higuera-Molina, Pérez-López, & Zafra-Gómez, 2017; López-Hernández, Zafra-
Gómez, Plata-Díaz, & Higuera-Molina, 2018), Portugal (Cruz & Marques, 2011; Ribeiro, 2017; 
Rodrigues, 2009; Rodrigues, Tavares, & Araújo, 2012; Tavares, 2017; Tavares & Camões, 2010), 
England (Andrews, Ferry, Skelcher, & Wegorowski, 2019; Dempsey, Burton, & Selin, 2016; 
Eckersley & Ferry, 2020; Ferry, Andrews, Skelcher, & Wegorowski, 2018), United States 
(Hawkins, 2017; Hefetz & Warner, 2012; Hefetz, Warner, & Vigoda-Gadot, 2015; Kim, 2018; Kim 
& Warner, 2016), Australia (Drew, McQuestin, & Dollery, 2019; Oosthuizen, Willett, Wilmshurst, 
& Williams, 2019) and Brazil (Silvestre, Marques, Dollery, & Correia, 2019).  
The delivering of services by local governments can be carried out through internal bureaucracies 
(hierarchy), private companies (markets) and partnerships (networks) with other governments or 
the non-profit sector (Rodrigues et al., 2012). The TCT is based on three pillars: specificity, 
frequency with which transactions occur and difficulty in measuring services (Williamson, 1981, 
1999). This theory is quite often used to understand the several options that is possible to adopt 
in public service delivery. However, other factors can be added to identify these options, for 
example, political cycles, party ideology, duration of contracts and degree of municipalities 
indebtedness, thus encompassing, in addition to economic transaction costs, political transaction 
costs (Arias Yurisch & Garrido-Vergara, 2019; Bel & Sebő, 2019; Blaeschke & Haug, 2018; Brown 
& Potoski, 2003; Casula, 2019; Dagdeviren & Robertson, 2016; Hawkins, 2017; Hefetz & Warner, 
2012; Horn, 1995; Ribeiro, 2017; Rodrigues et al., 2012; Wang, Liu, Xiong, & Zhu, 2019).  
This paper is an integral part of investigation whose main objective is to assess the influence of 
economic and political transaction costs in delivering of urban infrastructure services in Portugal 
and Brazil municipalities (for this reason TCT is addressed in the next topic). This investigation is 
under development and therefore will be presented here the concepts that will support surveys 
applied to 70 large municipalities distributed in both countries. The aforementioned concepts refer 
to the definition of which governance mechanisms are available in each country to delivery public 
services. For that purpose, we will use the legal basis in both Portugal and Brazil, in addition to 
the theoretical framework produced by other authors. We assume that, although with significantly 
different dimensions, the delivering mechanisms of two countries are very similar, allowing them 
to be compared, related and grouped within the three classic strands already mentioned in the 
delivering of services: hierarchy, markets and networks. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section analyses transaction cost theory and public 
services delivery. The second section introduces public services delivery by Brazilian and 
Portuguese Municipalities. Section three describes the data and methods conducted in section 
four. Lastly, we present the main results. We identify and compare the different options for 
delivering public services by Portuguese and Brazilian municipalities. 
1. Transaction Costs Theory and Public Services Delivery 
Public management must be promote the achievement of greater efficiency and effectiveness in 
quality of public services delivery, aiming social inclusion and the strengthening the capacity to 
formulate and implement public policies (Matias-Pereira, 2016). The emphasis on New Public 
Management (NPM) due to the fact that such movement begins the discussions about New 
Economic Institutionalism and consequently TCT, the theoretical framework that support this 
investigation. The article The Nature of the Firm by Ronald Coase, published in 1937, marks the 
beginning of this theoretical current and the expression Transaction Costs is defined later by 
Oliver Williamson (Coase, 1998). The Coase’s study can be considered the basis of governance 
theme that was imported from business world to describe different coordination arrangements 
from the markets and would later be applied to the world of power and local organizations (Matias-
Pereira, 2016). Coase (1937) pointed out that if only price mechanisms are sufficient to regulate 
production, it would not need any organization, however, as this does not occur, the allocation of 
resources would not be carried out exclusively based on production costs, but rather, in 
transaction costs that involve more than resources, for example, uncertainty, duration of contracts 
and risks in outsourcing some activities.  
Defenders of New Economic Institutionalism believes that organizations have a fundamental role 
in society and such existence is an attempt to reduce costs associated with transactions that take 
place in the market, thus originating TCT, which is a decision support methodology, whose unit 
of analysis is the transaction (Silvestre, 2010). According to Williamson (1981) a transaction 
occurs when a good or service is transferred from an internal structure of organization to 
another(s). Some transactions are simple and easy to mediate, and others are difficult and require 
more attention. Transaction costs are intended to assist in identifying which factors allow 
transactions to be assessed as one type or another, identifying which alternative governance 
mechanism within which transactions can be organized and whether it is possible to combine 
governance mechanism with transactions in a discriminatory manner (saving on transaction 
costs). 
Transactions are described based on three attributes: asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency 
(Williamson, 1981). Asset specificity refers to the degree of an asset used to support a transaction 
can be redeployed for alternative uses and users without loss of productive value. Highly specific 
investments give rise to a condition of bilateral dependence. Uncertainty presents the need for 
adaptation and faced with bilateral dependence and incomplete contracting, represents the risk 
of poor adaptation. Frequency is also a relevant dimension, as recurring transactions can support 
specialized financing configurations and have better computational and perfect properties 
(Williamson, 1999). North (1990) states that transaction costs are the costs of measuring and 
enforcing agreements. 
Additionally, limited rationality and opportunism are two behavioral assumptions that add realism 
to transaction costs, unlike the neoclassical economic approach (Williamson, 1981). Limited 
rationality is characterized by the lack of knowledge of all alternatives, uncertainty about 
exogenous and relevant events and an inability to measure consequences (Simon, 1979). 
Furthermore, limited rationality would not be a problem in a scenario where all agents are reliable, 
however, as this does not occur in the real world, organizations are predisposed to opportunism 
that some agents can exercise (Williamson, 1981, 1999). Opportunism is defined by Williamson 
(1985) as a condition of self-interest where there is an intention of fraud. This intention can 
manifest itself ex ante (adverse selection) or ex post (moral hazard) of signing contracts. 
According to Silvestre (2010) opportunism can also be intrinsic or extrinsic. While the first occurs 
within the organization and is guided by the individual interest of employees, the second arises 
from conflicts between organizations (contractor and contracted) and is guided by group interest 
where the dispute of interests brings together the individuals of each organization in an attempt 
to win supremacy over others.  
Besides economic transaction costs, there are political transaction costs, which are important for 
understanding decision-making in the public sector. While economic transaction costs are linked 
to measure goods and services with attributes of value or performance of agents, that is, 
measurement can be assessed by physical dimensions (with objective characteristics) and 
property rights (in legal terms), political transaction costs are built on the basis of costly 
information, subjective models to explain environments and the imperfect application of 
agreements, where choices involve high transaction costs and make political markets imperfect 
and prone to inefficiency (North, 1990). Political transaction costs see economic policy making as 
a political process limited by asymmetric information and reduced possibilities for compromise 
(Dixit, 2003). Political transaction costs arose as a consequence of several criticisms in relation 
to economic transaction costs, since only these would be insufficient to evaluate the public 
services delivery, as they would not consider the population's interest in services such as water, 
sanitation, health and education (Dagcdeviren & Robertson, 2016). 
At local level, for instance, the organization model may not only be guided by economic rationality, 
but rather by politics, to a greater, equal or lesser extent. That is, the ideal model in this case is 
one that is able to minimize costs of political transactions and maximizing the political efficiency 
of the policy maker by capturing electoral support for a re-election (Ribeiro, 2017). According to 
Horn (1995) electoral competition encourages lawmakers to make decisions that will increase 
their political support and protect their preferred policies from administrators and future legislators. 
In fact, in recent decades, central, federal and local governments have adopted different 
mechanism to reorganize the delivering of public services (Bel, Fageda, & Mur, 2013). One of the 
reasons for such reorganization is financial pressures (Silvestre et al., 2019) and the consequent 
increase in per capita spending on these services (Baba & Asami, 2019). Service delivery can 
take place basically through three governance mechanisms: hierarchy, markets and networks. 
The choice of one of these structures, or a mixture of them, has been focus of discussion in 
several studies and TCT is an important tool to evaluate the decision related to public services 
delivery, including the local public services (Aldag & Warner, 2018; Hefetz & Warner, 2012; 
Ribeiro, 2017; Rodrigues, 2011; Rodrigues et al., 2012), since the form of service delivery 
(internalized or externalized) is an important issue for the various public entities, in particular 
municipal entities (Higuera-Molina, Plata-Díaz, López-Hernández, & Zafra-Gómez, 2019). It 
should be noted that there is no a priori governance mechanism superior to the others. The 
concept of efficiency is based on adapting the governance mechanism to the characteristics of 
transaction (Peres, 2007).  
2. Public Services Delivery by Brazilian and Portuguese Municipalities 
Portugal currently has 308 municipalities. After the period of dictatorship, the country enacted its 
Constitution, in 1976, giving powers to local authorities. In the last 40 years these local authorities 
have been positively consolidated and have shown concrete and expressive results in terms of 
several attributions, such as rural and urban equipment, energy, transport, communications, 
heritage, culture, sports, health, housing, civil protection, environment, basic sanitation, spatial 
planning, urbanism, etc. (Souza, 2017). 
The organization level of Portuguese municipal services has gone through several stages. With 
the increase of municipal attributions, new alternatives of public service delivery were 
incorporated, for instance, institutional arrangements more defined and oriented to planned 
solutions. Initially emerge the municipalised services, which advanced for municipal companies, 
the contracting and concession of services as market alternatives, the association of 
municipalities, the non-profit organizations and the public and private partnerships. That is, all of 
these arrangements are identified as alternatives for delivering public services (Rodrigues et al., 
2009). However, if at a given moment the solution adopted was to outsource municipal services, 
recently it started to question the efficiency proclaimed with this practice and to evaluate the 
possibility of remunicipalising some services (Ribeiro, 2017). 
Brazil is a country with considerably larger territorial dimensions than Portugal, and currently has 
5,570 municipalities divided into 26 states (regional political-organizational level does not exist in 
Portugal). Similarly to Portugal, the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 was promulgated with the 
purpose of restructuring the State on democratic, federative and redistributive bases, opposing 
the previous period marked by authoritarian centralism and concentration of income resulting from 
the military dictatorship. In this sense, the municipalities were favored by territorial 
decentralization that allowed them to rise to the status of third federative entity. In addition, with 
the resumption of political autonomy, states and municipalities were able to establish their own 
governments (Soares & Melo, 2016; Souza, 2012). The 1988 Constitution is the first to give 
municipalities, article 29, the possibility of creating their own “Constitution”, called the Organic 
Law (Souza, 2012). 
Citing Brazilian’s Constitution is important because in the current regime there are competences 
that are common to the Union (Central Government), the states and the Federal District 
(intermediate level between the Union and the municipalities that not exist in Portugal) and the 
municipalities. In this way, the municipalities must act together with other entities of the Federation 
on topics such as: guarding the Constitution, laws and democratic institutions; conservation of 
public assets; public health and assistance for people with disabilities; historical, artistic and 
cultural heritage; culture; education; science; environment; housing; sanitation; social assistance 
and combating the causes of poverty; research and exploration of water and mineral resources 
in their territories; traffic safety education; public security; incentive to micro and small businesses; 
tourism; and health in general, with municipality's revenues linked to this area (Souza, 2012). 
That is, the public services under the exclusive responsibility of municipalities are not directly 
appointed. 
In this context, article 30 of Brazilian’s Constitution establishes that are among municipalities 
competences “legislate on matters of local interest” and “organize and provide, directly or under 
a concession or permission regime, public services of local interest, including public transport, 
which is essential”, but without giving an example of what these services could be. It’s important 
to note that such term “local interest” was introduced in 1988 Constitution to replace the term 
“peculiar interest” that was in force until the previous Constitutions. For Ferreira (2018), despite 
the difficulty in conceiving a legal concept to the expression “local interest”, it can be considered 
as most appropriated understanding that as a term that express “the interest that directly and 
immediately meets the needs of municipality, even if it proves to be also as a need for other 
entities”. It’s understood in this way that urban infrastructure services can be considered as “local 
interest”. 
Based on Constitution, the Master Plan for the Reform of the State (PDRAE, 1995) transferred 
from the Union to the states and municipalities the actions of a local nature and only in cases of 
emergency would direct action by the Union be applicable. In addition, the Fiscal Responsibility 
Law (FRL), enacted in 2000, aimed to control public spending and transparency in tax 
management. Thus, it also aimed to avoid opportunistic behaviors at the end of the term (Araújo, 
Santos Filho, & Gomes, 2015; Santolin, Jayme Junior, & Reis, 2009). Santolin et al. (2009) assess 
that FRL was important to reduce municipal deficits, however, the imposition of rules may lead to 
limitation of effective government participation in countercyclical fiscal policy. Araújo et al. (2015) 
also found that municipalities with greatest dependence on transfers are the ones that have 
suffered the greatest impact on investment capacity, such as carrying out public works and 
delivering services to their citizens. 
In Brazil, the delivery of public services under municipal responsibility occurs in a similar way to 
Portugal. That is, they can be provided by the Direct, Indirect Local Administration (public or mixed 
companies), private companies and consortiums. Due to Brazilian political characteristics, local 
services can still be provided by state companies, usually for water, sewage and energy services 
(Rossoni, 2015). 
Silvestre et al. (2019) identified in Brazil that most common forms of cooperation are, in this order, 
intermunicipal cooperation, public-public partnerships with state governments, and finally, with 
the federal government. Cooperation arrangements are concentrated on social services, health, 
culture and housing. It appears that small and medium-sized local governments are more likely 
to benefit from cooperation. This seems to come from economies of scale and improvement of 
administrative and technical capacity through cooperation. In addition, the population and its 
composition (considering the age group) are the main factors responsible for the decrease in local 
spending. 
In short Table 1 presents a comparison between Brazil and Portugal in terms of political division, 










Table 1. General comparison between Brazil and Portugal. 
Country Portugal Brazil 
Title - Division Portuguese Republic – Centralized Unitary State 
Federative Republic of Brazil - 
Federal State 
Political division 
• Central Government 
• Autonomous regions 
• Local Authorities (municipalities and 
parishes) 
• Union 
• States and Federal District 
• Municipalities 
Number of 
municipalities (quantity) 308 5570 
Nomenclatures of 
municipal bodies 
City councils (executive) municipal prefectures (executive) 
Municipal assemblies (deliberative) City councils (deliberative) 
Parish Councils and Parish Assemblies - 
Population (inhabitants) 10.27 million - 2017 210.15 million - 2017 
Annual GDP per capita 
(euros / inhabitant) € 22,987.00 (2017) € 6,912.81 (2017) 
Area (km²) 92,225.61 8,510,820.62 
Demographic density 
(inhab / km²) 111.40 22.43 
Local public services 
under responsibility of 
municipalities 
Rural and urban equipment; energy; 
communications and transport; 
education; heritage, science and 
culture; sport and leisure; health; social 
action; housing; civil protection; 
sanitation and environment; consumer 
defense; promoting development; 
spatial planning and urbanism; 
municipal police and external 
cooperation. 
 
All of “local interest”, including health 
and education 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), National 
Institute of Statistics of Portugal (INE) and Ribeiro (2017). Note:1.00 euro = 4.60 Brazilian Real 
 
3. Data and Methods 
This paper based on qualitative analysis to collecting and analyze all relevant documentary 
material to achieve our goal: explores the different options for delivering public services by 
Portuguese and Brazilian municipalities, identifying possible similarities and differences between 
two countries. Initially, and for each country, we consulted the most significant legislation that 
guides the delivery of local public services. The surveys were carried out on the website of District 
Attorney General of Lisbon (Portugal), who have a specific section for legislation applicable to 
local authorities, and on Legislation Portal (Brazil). Also consulted and integrated investigation 
already published on this topic. 
4. Findings 
4.1. Portugal 
Portugal presents laws that are essential in organization of services provided by local authorities. 
Following, the main aspects of these laws will be commented. 
Decree-Law no. 305/2009, of 23th October, amendment by Law no. 71/2018, of 31th December, 
establishes the regime for the organization of local authority services. This Decree-Law was 
published with background of Public Administration modernization and establishes the internal 
organization of municipal services must be adequate to hierarchical, matrix or mixed structure 
model. The hierarchical structure consists of nuclear organic units (made up of municipal 
departments or directions) and flexible units (made up of flexible organic units, headed by 
municipal division head) that can be created, altered or extinguished in order to ensure the 
permanent adequacy of the service. The matrix structure is adopted whenever the operational 
areas of services can be essentially developed by projects. The Decree-law also establishes the 
competences of city councils (equivalent to municipal prefectures in Brazil), municipal assemblies 
(equivalent to city councils in Brazil) and parish councils and parish assemblies (structures without 
direct correlation with the Brazilian system). 
Law no. 75/2013, of 12th September, establishes the legal regime for local authorities, approves 
the statute for intermunicipal entities, establishes the legal regime for the transfer of competences 
from State to local and intermunicipal entities and approves the legal regime for municipal 
associations. This law its quite important because it contains the attributions of city councils, 
municipal assemblies, parish councils and parish assemblies. Define also the concepts and 
objectives of decentralization as well as the delegation of competences into parishes.  
Another important law is the Law no. 50/2012, of 31th August, which approves the legal regime 
of local business activity and local participation. This Law also list some public services that are 
considered essential, such as water supply and wastewater collection and treatment; collection 
and treatment of solid urban waste; maintenance of public roads, with a view to ensuring the 
safety of people and goods; and urgent intervention in situations that pose a danger to the health 
or safety of people. 
Based on these diplomas and others references (Ribeiro, 2017; Rodrigues, Araújo, & Tavares, 
2009), it is possible to list five governance mechanisms for local service delivery’s in Portuguese 
municipalities: own services (municipal services and municipalised services), local business 
sector (municipal, intermunicipal and metropolitan companies), municipal associations (general 
and specific purpose associations), private sector (privatizations, concessions, outsourcing) and 
non-profit sector (third sector), as shown in Figure 1 (Ribeiro, 2017; Rodrigues et al. 2009).  
 
Figure 1. Municipal Service Delivery, Portuguese Municipalities 
Source: Ribeiro (2017) 
 
Municipal services and municipalised services, configured as their own municipal services, are 
similar in non-existence of competition and inter-organizational cooperation, however, 
municipalised services have a degree of indirect control, unlike municipal services (Rodrigues et 
al., 2009).  
Municipalised services are also part of local business activity, ruled by aforementioned Law no. 
50/2012, of 31th August, that establishes activities carried out by municipalities, municipalities 
associations, regardless of their type, and metropolitan areas through municipalised or 
intermunicipalized services and local enterprises, which might have municipal, intermunicipal or 















Local enterprises can also be classified as managing services of general interest, which ensure 
the provision of continued services, or promoting local and regional development, which aim to 
promote economic growth, eliminate asymmetries and strengthen social and economic cohesion. 
In addition, the law allows municipalities, municipalities associations and metropolitan areas to 
hold participations in other institutions. These participations are governed by commercial law and 
do not assume the nature of local enterprises. Participated commercial companies are 
considered. 
Municipal associations are also an alternative way of delivering local public services. Law no. 
73/2013, of 3th September, provides typology, feature and constitution of municipalities 
associations, which can be of two types, namely, associations with specific purposes and 
associations with multiple purposes. Specific purpose associations are voluntary and can be 
freely created by municipalities. Multi-purpose associations are imposed by the aforementioned 
law and may take the form of intermunicipal communities or metropolitan areas. 
The private sector can be used to replace the municipality, to carry out certain activities, in this 
case, concessions and privatization of public services are considered. Although similar, the first 
is characterized by giving a private power to occupy, use and exploit a portion of public domain, 
for their own benefit, through the performance of commercial activity, limiting or excluding its use 
by third parties. In fact, the concession means granting the right to exploit a public good or service 
to an external agent, who is willing to assume the responsibility of exploiting it, in the manner 
permitted by the municipality. Through privatization, governments divest themselves the 
responsibility for producing public services by transferring them to third parties Ribeiro (2017).  
To finalize the list, non-profit organizations are identified. These operate outside public sector 
(state) and private sector. This sector comprises private, non-profit-distributing, self-governing 
and voluntary organizations. The main examples are mutual associations, cooperatives, 
foundations, private social solidarity institutions, local development organizations, non-
governmental development cooperation organizations, federations, unions and confederations 
Ribeiro (2017). 
4.2. Brazil 
The political organization of Brazil foresees, in addition to Federal Government and Municipalities, 
the States, which constitute the units of higher hierarchy within political-administrative 
organization of country. In general, the Union (Federal Government) create laws, but States and 
municipalities can make their own laws, as long as they are more restrictive than federal ones. In 
contrast to Portugal, studies that relate forms of public services delivering by Brazilian’s 
municipalities are not easily found, so this analysis was carried out based on legislation in force. 
We make an exploratory analysis trying to identify if forms of public services delivering listed by 
Ribeiro (2017) can be found in Brazil. Despite some similarities it is expected peculiarities of 
Brazilian’s municipalities context.  
Thus, considering their own services, naturally in Brazilian context, municipalities also deliver 
public services through their own internal structure, that is, control is performed directly by 
municipal administration. On the other hand, in Brazilian context the figure of municipalised 
services, foreseen in Portugal, is not existed.  
In addition to municipal services, municipalities can deliver public services through other 
organizations related to public sector. These organizations are in article 37 of Brazilian 
Constitution enacted in 1988. In order to compare with Portugal, we divide the organizations into 
local business sector, when they are part of municipal administration and public business sector, 
when they are part of states and Union administrations.  
The Brazilian local business sector is made up of autarchies, foundations, municipal and 
metropolitan enterprises and municipal mixed-economy societies. Autarchies are legal entities 
under private law, which have their own autonomy, assets and revenues, with the purpose of 
carrying out typical activities of local Administration. Foundations, on the other hand, are legal 
institutions governed by public law that municipalities can use do delivery specific public services, 
created through explicit laws. The accountability of these entities is given directly to Court of 
Auditors and as it is a public right, its assets are inalienable (Júnior, 2010). Both autarchies and 
foundations are not found in Portuguese scenario. Municipal and metropolitan enterprises and 
municipal mixed-economy societies are legal entities governed by private law, governed by Law 
13.303/2016, of 30th June, which have in common the following characteristics: (i) being 
controlled by Legislative power, with assistance of Court of Auditors; (ii) be included in Public 
Budget; (iii) must comply with principles of Public Administration and, (iv) must comply with Law 
8.666/1993. The difference between the two forms is in source of capital. While municipal and 
metropolitan companies have entirely municipal capital, capital municipal mixed-economy 
societies are formed by public and private shareholders (Júnior, 2010). 
The public business sector, also governed by Law 13.303/2016, of 30th June, is formed by 
institutions linked to States and Union, and following the same definitions established to local 
business sector, with the difference that they are in other spheres of Brazilian public 
administration. In this case the capital is not municipal but of these entities (States and Union). 
The public business sector can be an extra alternative to deliver public services of Brazilian 
municipalities, which can use these institutions through public service concessions, as is the case 
of state sanitation companies that deliver services of this nature to municipalities. Public service 
concession is not verified in the Portuguese context. 
The Municipal Associations in Brazil were regulated by Bill 486/2017. However, this project does 
not allow associated management of public services, since this prerogative is conferred to 
municipal consortia, governed by Law 11.107/2005, of 6th of April. The Municipal Consortia are 
made up of public association or private legal entity with a voluntary character defined in 241 
Article of Brazilian Federal Constitution. According to Avezedo (2004) Municipal Consortia are 
cooperation agreements for organization and delivery of public services, while Municipal 
Associations towards administrative matters, such as technical training of civil servants, sharing 
of equipment and personnel to reduce costs, or technical advice for various subjects. In this way, 
the associations of municipalities verified in Portugal are directly related to Brazilian Municipal 
Consortia. 
In Brazilian municipal associations context, it is important to highlight the existence of Brazilian 
metropolitan regions, which are the regional units regulated by Law 13.683/2018, of 19th June, 
instituted by States and constituted by bordering Municipalities to integrate the organization, 
planning and performance of public functions of common interest. But, contrary to Portuguese 
context, the association of municipalities in metropolitan regions does not constitute a form of 
public service delivery, but rather a geographic organization of neighboring municipalities which, 
when they wish, may resort to other forms to deliver services. It seems, therefore, that existence 
of states, a political level above municipalities, in the case of Brazil, does not require the creation 
of Intermunicipal Communities and Metropolitan Areas as we have in Portugal. In summary, the 
Brazilian municipal associativism as a way of delivering services is limited to institution of 
municipal consortia. 
The private sector is also another way that municipalities can use to delivery public services. The 
hiring of private agents is part of the list of options, the private concession of services for a certain 
period, both governed by Law 8.666/93, of 21th June, and privatizations, which represent the 
permanent transfer of public services execution for private initiative. There are no differences 
between these options adopted by Portugal and Brazil.  
Finally, there are also Civil Society Organizations of Public Interest, similar to Non-Profit 
Organizations of Portugal, governed by Law 9.790/1990, of 23th March. Non-profitable 
organizations are private legal institutions that do not distribute, among their partners or 
associates, directors, officers, employees or donors, any operating surpluses, gross or net, 
dividends, bonuses, interests or portions of their assets, earned through the exercise of its 
activities, and which fully applies them to the achievement of the respective corporate purpose. 
In general, non-profit organizations are dedicated to services that promote social development, 
health, education and culture. 
Presented forms of public service delivery in Brazilian municipalities, and based on the forms 
found in Portugal, it is possible to identify that the same forms are present in both countries, 
although with particular characteristics, as is the case of public business sector that in Brazilian 
case covers other administrative spheres, namely, states and Union. However, for classification 
purposes, when municipalities choose to deliver services by these entities, it is understood that a 
public concession of services occurs, that is, a form of delivery is added particular to Brazilian 
case, as shown in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Municipal Service Delivery, Brazilian Municipalities 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
4.3. Comparison between Brazil and Portugal 
Based on forms of public service delivery found in Portugal and Brazil, it is possible to establish 
a comparison between two countries regarding the options available for this purpose and to 
identify hierarchical, market and network structures. In general, the five forms of delivery identified 
in Portugal can be related to other five Brazilian forms (figures 1 and 2). In both countries, services 
can be delivered by internal structure through municipal services, however, there is no 
municipalised services in Brazil. Like Portuguese local business sector, Brazilian municipalities 
are endowed with similar alternatives for public services delivery. However, public business sector 
is added to Brazil context, where there is the possibility to municipalities use other governmental 
spheres, usually in areas of sanitation. This option is not available for Portuguese municipalities. 
The municipal associations are another option adopted in both countries. However, while 
Intermunicipal Communities and metropolitan areas in Portugal is mandatory, these are not 
verified in Brazil as they can be replaced using the public business sector. The municipalities 
Associations in Portugal and the creation of Municipal Consortia, in Brazil, are forms of voluntary 
association that share the same characteristics. It is noteworthy that in Brazil the formation of 
metropolitan regions is imposed on certain municipalities, however, the form of service delivery 
is not an obligation, unless there is a common agreement among members for the adoption of a 
certain option, including in this case, the formation of metropolitan consortia or companies. The 
private sector can also be a way of delivering services in both countries, whether by hiring private 
agents, by private concession of services or by privatization. Finally, partnerships with non-profit 



















Table 2 summarizes the forms of public service delivery identified in Portugal and Brazil and their 
relationship with governance mechanism: hierarchy, market and networks. 




Mechanism Portugal Brazil 
Own Municipal 
services Hierarchy 
Municipal services Municipal services 
Municipalised services ____ 
Local business 
sector Market 
Local enterprises (municipal, 
intermunicipal or metropolitan) 
Municipal and metropolitan 
enterprises 
____ Autarchies and Foundations (municipal level) 
Mixed-economy societies Municipal mixed-economy societies 
Public business 
sector Market ____ 
Public entreprises, mixed-
economy societies, autarchies 




Intermunicipal Communities or 
Metropolitan Areas ____ 
Municipal Associations Municipal Consortia 
Private Setor Market 
Private service concessions Private service concessions 
Privatization Privatization 
Non-profit setor Networks Non-profit organizations Civil Society Organizations of Public Interest 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Conclusion 
The public services delivery by Portuguese and Brazilian municipalities is based on several laws. 
However, Portuguese municipalities have more specific definitions of what forms are available to 
deliver such services while in Brazil the federal legislation is more generic. The dimensions of two 
countries seem to be a point to be explored to explain the difficulty of, for example, in Brazil there 
is less uniformity and information availability. Even with social, economic and geographic 
differences, it is possible to establish a relationship between the forms of public service delivery 
and governance mechanism existent in Brazil and Portugal, although with some particularities. In 
both countries, public services can be delivered through municipal services, local business sector, 
municipal associations, private sector and non-profit sector. Further analyzes reveals that 
Portugal have forms of public service delivery inexistent in Brazil: municipalised services, 
intermunicipal enterprises, Intermunicipal Communities and Metropolitan Areas. In Brazil, given 
the administrative political division, we add public business sector, which includes, for example, 
state enterprises, generally in the sanitation area, which deliver public services to several 
municipalities within the same state under a public service concession regime. As in Portugal 
there is no territorial division by states, normally municipalities associated through cooperation 
arrangements to delivery such public services instead of public service concession regime. In 
short, this exploratory analyzes aims to explore the different options for delivering public services 
by Portuguese and Brazilian municipalities, finding similarities and differences in these two 
countries.  
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